We investigate the effects of PCAOB inspections on the relationships between Big 4 auditors and their clients using a new measure to capture the information garnered from the reports. Specifically, we measure the relative importance of accounting standards to each client's financial statements and calculate the exposure to deficient auditing by relating their auditor's inspection deficiencies to the accounting standards. This measure of deficient auditing exposure is then adjusted by the exposure that would occur for the average of the other Big 4 auditors. We find that our measure of relative exposure to deficient auditing is positively related to auditor changes, but is not related to audit changes in audit fees. These results suggest PCAOB inspections affect auditor-client relationships, but auditors do not have the ability to increase fees to remediate deficient auditing, nor do they reduce fees to retain clients when they have more deficiencies in areas important to the clients. Our findings have implications for understanding and regulating the market for audit services.
Introduction
One of the most important aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB is charged with establishing standards for auditing public companies, inspecting auditors with publically held clients, and levying penalties on auditors who do not comply with PCAOB standards. In 2005 testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives, former PCAOB Chairman James McDonough emphasized the importance of auditor inspections stating, "…the more significant, long-term effects of our work will be the product of our oversight activities" (PCAOB 2005) . Auditors, however, have sometimes been critical of what the PCAOB identifies as deficiencies in its inspection reports. Deloitte, for example, responded to its 2007 PCAOB inspection report by saying, "reasonable judgments should be respected and not second-guessed" (Johnson 2009) . While the PCAOB's inspection process has clearly led to significant changes in the way audits are conducted, there has been little research that investigates the effects of reporting inspection deficiencies.
We investigate whether PCAOB inspection reports affect auditor-client relationships. First, we look for evidence of audit fee changes related to inspection issues. When the PCAOB identifies that an audit is deficient in a particular area, the auditor is expected to take action to address the issue. The auditor may work to improve auditing in the area of the deficiency, both at the client where the issue was identified and at other clients, and this additional work may lead to higher fees. For example, the 2006 inspection report of PricewaterhouseCoopers states that at Issuer A, "The Firm failed to test the fair value of warrants and stock-based compensation issued in two significant transactions during the year."
1 To improve in this area, PricewaterhouseCoopers may revise its audit procedures not only for Issuer A, but also for other issuers or clients that have high levels of warrants and stock-based transactions. Auditors 1 The PCAOB does not disclose the names of the clients where audit deficiencies are identified.
have a strong incentive to address their deficiencies because the PCAOB may see a failure to do so as a lack of quality control. The PCAOB also evaluates auditors' quality control systems, and can make these deficiencies public if they are not resolved within one year (PCAOB 2012) . 2 Another possibility is that an auditor will see the PCAOB's attention on the area as an indication of higher audit risk and thus raise fees on clients that have exposure to the area where the deficiency was identified. Conversely, audit fees may decrease if auditors reduce fees in an attempt to retain the clients. An Auditor may agree to lower fees to pacify a client that might otherwise dismiss the auditor because of a negative PCAOB inspection report related to the client's accounting (Abbot, Gunny, and Zhang 2013) .
Second, we investigate whether PCAOB inspection reports affect the likelihood of Big 4 auditor changes. A client may choose to dismiss an auditor that receives a negative PCAOB inspection report (Abbot, Gunny, and Zhang 2013) and may be especially likely to dismiss their auditor or not engage a new auditor if the auditor has deficiencies in an area that is important to the client's accounting. The PCAOB specifically suggests that audit committees ask auditors about deficiencies identified in their audit as well as in audits of other clients that have similar accounting to the client (PCAOB 2012) . It is also possible that auditors want to avoid or discontinue relationships with clients that have high exposure to certain accounting standards. Auditors may also be more likely to resign from or refuse to take on marginal clients that use accounting standards that increase the auditors' exposure to areas where inspection deficiencies are likely.
An alternative to the hypothesized relations discussed above is that PCAOB inspection reports do not affect auditor-client relationships for Big 4 auditors. There are reasons to believe that the PCAOB reports are not informative to clients. For example, Lennox and Pittman (2010) find no evidence of a relation between the number of issues identified in PCAOB inspections and changes in auditor market 2 As an example, in the 2008 and 2009 inspection reports for PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the PCAOB inspectors noted deficiencies related to auditing fair value measurements. Subsequently, Part II of those inspection reports were released because the PCAOB felt PwC had not made sufficient progress in addressing quality controls with respect to auditing fair value measurements, despite PwC taking actions which "included providing our audit professionals with enhanced audit tools, training and additional technical guidance to promote more consistent audit execution." Of the Big 4 audit firms, only KPMG has yet to have a Part II of an annual inspection report released.
share. Gunny and Zhang (2013) also suggest inspection findings do not inform about audit quality for larger audit firms, which the PCAOB inspects annually. Further, the PCAOB reports that auditors often dismiss inspection findings in their communications with audit committees (PCAOB 2012) .
To investigate the relation between PCAOB inspection results and auditor-client relationships, we examine PCAOB inspection reports issued between 2005 and 2011 for Big 4 auditors. We search each inspection report for a list of keywords developed by Folsom, Hribar, Mergenthaler, and Peterson (2012) that relate to each accounting standard. If an inspection report contains a keyword related to a particular accounting standard, this indicates the auditor had a deficiency related to auditing this standard. We also determine how frequently the accounting standard keywords are used in each client's financial statements to understand the relative exposure each client has to the accounting standard. We then examine how clients' exposure to accounting standards related to areas where their auditor has PCAOB identified deficiencies affects changes in audit fees and auditor changes.
We find that when a client-auditor pair has a high level of exposure to deficient auditing, based on the client's relative use of the accounting standards and the auditor's deficiencies in these areas relative to other Big 4 auditors, there is a higher likelihood of an auditor change occurring. There is also lower deficient auditing exposure in the resulting new auditor-client pair. Deficient auditing exposure, however, does not appear to be related to changes in audit fees for auditor-client relationships that are maintained. Together, these results suggest that information in PCAOB inspection reports affect auditorclient relationships by helping to align clients' accountings with Big 4 auditors' expertise.
This paper makes a number of contributions to existing literature. First, the paper further explores the effects of PCAOB inspections on auditor-client relationships. The literature to date has found only limited evidence that PCAOB inspections affect these relationships. Lennox and Pittman (2010) conclude clients do not find the inspection reports informative because auditors' quality control system deficiencies are not publically disclosed. Other studies provide evidence that triennially inspected auditors (auditors with fewer than 100 clients) are more likely to be dismissed when they have GAAPdeficient PCAOB reports (Abbott, Gunny, and Zhang 2013) and that smaller, lower quality auditors exit the audit market (Defond and Lennox 2011) . Our study, however, focuses on the effects that PCAOB inspection reports have on Big 4 auditors and their clients. Included in our study is an examination of the reports' effects on audit fees, an aspect of the auditor-client relationship that has received little attention in prior studies on the effects of PCAOB inspection reports.
Second, our paper introduces a new approach to examining deficiencies identified in PCAOB inspection reports. Specifically, we link PCAOB inspection deficiencies to firms' financial statements using an accounting standard keyword list developed by Folsom, Hribar, Mergenthaler, and Peterson (2012) . Prior work has relied on the number of issues identified in PCAOB inspection reports (e.g., Lennox and Pittman 2010; Abbott, Gunny, and Zhang 2013) , which may be less relevant to clients' auditor-engagement decisions than the types of deficiencies found. Our method is particularly advantageous because the PCAOB releases little information about the clients where inspections issues are identified. 3 Because the client or the industry in which the client operates cannot usually be identified, linking deficiencies related to accounting standards related with clients' exposure to those standards may be the best option for determining how specific types of PCAOB audit deficiencies affect clients.
Our paper also has implications for auditing regulation and practice. Our results on PCAOB inspection reports and audit fees provide information on whether the inspection reports improve audit quality. We would expect fees to increase for clients with exposure to accounting standards related to PCAOB audit deficiencies if auditors begin to do more testing to remediate these deficiencies. We would expect lower fees if auditors reduce fees to pacify their clients after negative PCAOB reports. Lower fees could hinder resolving the audit deficiencies and may lead to deficiencies in other areas if the auditor is spread thin as a result of the audit fee cuts. Our results do not show evidence of either scenario, which suggests that Big 4 audit firms with more deficiency exposure have little ability to negotiate higher fees, but also do not appear to lower fees to retain clients. Further, our results provide evidence on PCAOB 3 Language in the SOX legislation actually prohibits the PCAOB from releasing the names of the clients where the inspection issues are identified.
inspections improving audit quality by aligning clients with auditors that have more expertise in the accounting standards used by the clients. This evidence has important implications for proposed rules requiring auditor rotation. Auditor rotation could possibly have a negative effect on audit quality because it could undo gains related to auditor-client realignment resulting from PCAOB inspections.
Background and Hypothesis Development

Background on PCAOB inspection process
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was established by the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (SOX) as part of sweeping reforms aimed at restoring investor confidence in capital markets after a number of high-profile accounting frauds. The PCAOB is charged with overseeing public company auditors by establishing auditing standards, performing inspections, and assessing penalties for failure to adhere to its standards. Prior to the establishment of the PCAOB, the audit profession was largely self-regulated. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) created auditing standards and established a peer review process in which member firms selected another audit firm to perform an annual review.
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires audit firms that audit over 100 public clients to be inspected annually and auditors with fewer public clients to be inspected every three years (PCAOB 2008) . The PCAOB inspections program uses a risk-based approach to selecting audit engagements, and audit areas within those engagements, and thus the inspection findings are not necessarily representative of all audit engagements (Gradison and Boster 2010) . Inspectors may identify audit deficiencies as well as GAAP departures, and these findings are made public in a report released typically several months following the inspection (although the client is not identified in the public report). Quality control deficiencies identified during the inspection process are only made public if they are not remediated to the Board's satisfaction within 12 months.
Impact of the PCAOB Inspection Process
To date, there is limited evidence on the impact of the PCAOB inspection process on audit quality. In fact, the PCAOB and others have acknowledged it is difficult to measure "audit quality," which in turn makes it difficult to assess improvements in audit quality (e.g. propensity to issue going concern opinions as well as disclose material weaknesses in internal controls, in foreign jurisdictions subject to PCAOB inspections versus those that have refused the PCAOB access to inspect, and finds evidence of higher audit quality in those jurisdictions with "inspection exposure." He finds no evidence of such a difference prior to the PCAOB's existence, and concludes exposure to the PCAOB inspection process has resulted in an improvement in audit quality. Similarly, Gramling, Krishnan and Zhang (2011) find an increased likelihood of issuing going concern opinions following PCAOB inspections of triennially-inspected audit firms.
Evidence related to audit quality may also be inferred by the findings form DeFond and Lennox (2011) who document that more than 600 small audit firms ceased auditing public clients after the passage of SOX. DeFond and Lennox (2011) note that these were lower quality auditors since they either avoided AICPA peer review or PCAOB inspection or were more likely to have deficiencies if they did have a review or inspection (DeFond and Lennox 2011). The publicly-traded client firms would then be forced to switch to an audit firm still registered with the PCAOB, presumably a higher quality audit firm.
The authors do in fact find support that audit quality, measured by the likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion, increased for these client firms following the switch.
In this study, we seek to provide evidence on how the inspection process itself, and in particular the PCAOB's focus on high risk audit areas, may improve (or possibly reduce) audit quality. While prior studies provide evidence of audit quality on average, as proxied by either the likelihood of issuing a going concern opinion or abnormal accruals, we examine whether audit firms and clients respond to the particular audit and/or GAAP deficiencies identified in the inspection process. As discussed earlier, the PCAOB's focus on particular audit areas will likely impact both audit firm behavior and client firms' assessments of their current auditor. The inspection process sheds light on audit deficiencies and audit firms may increase audit effort in these areas, or may even choose to avoid client firms with significant exposure to particular high risk areas. In addition, the inspection process may provide evidence of an audit firm's quality which could result in client firms renegotiating audit fees or seeking a new auditor.
We discuss each of these potential impacts in greater detail below.
Audit Firm Responses to PCAOB Inspections
There tend to be common themes across PCAOB inspection reports in terms of the audit areas reviewed and deficiencies identified. For example, in their summary of 2004-2007 inspection findings for the annually inspected firms, the PCAOB notes that it continues to observe deficiencies in the significant areas of revenue, fair value, management's estimates, determination of materiality, and audit scope (PCAOB 2008) . The PCAOB also notes that it will continue to focus on these significant areas in future inspections. In a study summarizing the PCAOB inspection findings for the annually inspected firms over the period -2009 , Church and Shefchik (2012 also note the most common deficiencies involve testing revenues, fair value measurements, other accounting estimates, and internal controls. Thus, the engagements selected for review by the PCAOB are likely to be those with significant exposure to the areas of concern. For example, the PCAOB paid particular attention to audits of companies in the financial services sector following the financial crisis (PCAOB 2010).
There are various ways in which audit firms may respond following the identification and disclosure of audit deficiencies. Audit firms may merely become more conservative in their reporting decisions. For example, the findings of Lamoreaux (2013) may be evidence of changes in reporting decisions in that audit firms increase the likelihood of issuing a going concern opinion and disclosing a material weakness in internal controls. This does not necessarily imply they have changed their audit approach to increase the amount of audit evidence gathered in these areas.
Alternatively, auditors may choose to increase audit effort in particular high risk areas they believe the PCAOB will focus on during the inspection, or that were focus areas in previous inspections. Carcello, Hollingsworth, and Mastrolia (2011) note that firms can adjust their audit approach, address issues through their continuing education programs, and strengthen their internal work paper review procedures in response to deficiencies identified in an inspection. For example, audit firms often note in their written response to an inspection report that they are increasing training and documentation in particular areas as a result of deficiencies identified by the PCAOB. We expect this would translate into additional audit effort and fees for client firms with significant exposure to the audit area in which a deficiency was identified (e.g. fair value estimates).
In some cases, an audit firm may choose to resign from clients with significant exposure in areas where the audit firm performs poorly. When the PCAOB identifies a deficiency at an audit firm, the firm may perceive clients with heavy exposure to the related accounting standard as higher risk because the firm will have to make changes to its audit procedures for those clients. Further, auditors may perceive higher reputation risk from auditing these clients because continuing to audit them may result in future deficiencies identified by the PCAOB.
Client Firm Responses to PCAOB Inspection Reports
Since the passage and implementation of SOX, the audit committee has been responsible for the hiring and firing the external auditor and for evaluating them on an annual basis. The PCAOB believes their reports should be informative to audit committees making auditor acceptance and retention decisions. PCAOB Chairman James Doty, for example, states, "Whether an audit committee's own company audit is being reviewed as part of an inspection, or whether it's another company within the same industry, PCAOB inspection reports provide insight into areas of risk and audit quality that are of concern to all audit committees" (Whitehouse 2012 ).
In a discussion paper aimed at audit committee members, the PCAOB provides recommended questions the audit committee should present to their audit firm in order to understand the implications of inspection findings (PCAOB 2012) . One of the issues they recommend audit committees discuss is whether or not deficiencies identified on other audit engagements are related to audit areas of their company. In addition, the PCAOB recommends the audit committee ask what the audit firm is doing to remediate any identified deficiencies. This document suggests the PCAOB believes there is useful information for audit committees in the inspection reports that should be considered in their annual evaluation of the incumbent audit firm, even if their company's audit was not selected for inspection.
Audit committees and management may react to this information in various ways. An optimistic view is that they encourage their audit firm to invest in training and developing the appropriate audit methodology to address the deficiencies, and state they support their auditor in increasing audit effort in high risk areas. On the other hand, a pessimistic view is that the audit committee finds the inspection reports uninformative, unrelated to their particular engagement, or dismisses the deficiencies as being trivial and insignificant, and argues against any additional work that would increase fees.
Several studies discuss and examine the information content of PCAOB inspection reports, but evidence on the usefulness of the reports is limited. One reason the reports may be viewed as uninformative by audit committees and others is that the selection of audit engagements is risk-based and therefore the findings are not generalizable or necessarily representative of audit quality for any particular audit firm. Others suggest that the inspections focus on trivial and/or inconsequential audit deficiencies (Glover, Prawitt, and Taylor 2009; DeFond 2010 ) and thus may not be informative to audit committees.
Despite these concerns, some evidence indicates that the reports are associated with audit quality or perceptions of audit quality.
Gunny and Zhang (2012) examine whether PCAOB inspection reports provide information about audit quality by associating the severity of deficiencies with proxies for audit quality. They find the inspection reports for triennially-inspected firms provide information about audit quality, i.e. clients of auditors with "seriously deficient" reports (reports that claim deficiencies lead to GAAP departures) have significantly higher abnormal accruals and are more likely to restate their financial statements. However, this report classification does not distinguish among the annually inspected audit firms, as there is less variability in these reports in terms of the number and severity of deficiencies. In addition, Abbott, Gunny, and Zhang (2013) find that clients of triennially inspected auditors with GAAP deficiencies identified in their PCAOB inspection reports are more likely to dismiss their auditors, and this association is stronger for companies with greater agency conflicts and more effective audit committees. The Abbott, Gunny, and Zhang (2013) results suggest clients of triennially inspected audit firms use the inspection reports as a signal of audit quality.
In contrast, Lennox and Pittman (2010) conclude that less information about audit quality is conveyed with the inception of the PCAOB inspection process, as compared to what was conveyed under the prior peer review regime, and that audit clients do not find the PCOAB inspection reports useful in signaling audit quality. Their conclusion is based on a lack of association between the number (or unexpected number) of deficiencies disclosed in PCAOB inspection reports and changes in audit firm market shares. Lennox and Pittman (2010) also note there is criticism over the initial confidentiality of quality control concerns (Part II of the PCAOB reports), and suggest this lack of transparency contributes to the lack of informativeness of the reports. However, as noted by DeFond (2010), even if the reports are "uninformative" to client firms, the inspection process may still result in improvements in audit quality.
In a more recent study examining the public disclosure of Part II findings for triennially inspected firms that do not remediate quality control deficiencies to the satisfaction of the PCAOB within 12 months, Ragothaman (2012) finds the PCAOB reports disclose a greater number of quality control deficiencies relative to peer review reports, suggesting the PCAOB is more harsh than the peer reviewers and may provide an ex ante incentive to improve audit quality.
Types of Deficiencies and the Audit Market
It is important to understand how audit firms and their clients react to the deficiencies as this has implications for audit market concentration and audit quality. In the final report from The Department of the Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession, the committee notes "Auditing firms, public companies, market participants, academics, investors and others reasoned that large public companies with operations in multiple countries need auditing firms with global resources and technical and industry expertise to deal with an increasingly complex business and financial reporting environment" (Department of the Treasury 2008, p. VIII:2). The committee concludes that these needs restrict the choice of auditor for the large multinational companies to just the global auditing firms. As accounting standards increase in complexity and the PCAOB focuses on the auditing of these most complex standards, more clients may be driven to seek the expertise of a global auditing firm, and even limit their choices among the Big 4 accounting firms.
At the same time, regulators express concern that too much concentration in the audit market decreases quality-based competition and may result in reduced audit quality (Department of the Treasury 2008, p. VIII:2-3). To the extent we observe auditor-switching activity, rather than increasing audit fees related to improved audit procedures in response to deficiencies identified in PCAOB inspection reports, reduced audit market competition could be an unintended consequence of the inspection process.
Hypotheses
There is little prior research on how auditors and clients react to PCAOB inspection reports and how these reports affect auditor-client relationships. While there is some evidence that clients are more likely to dismiss smaller, triennially-inspected audit firms with inspection deficiencies, there is no such evidence for clients of Big 4 auditors. An important question is whether audit deficiencies affect auditorclient relationships in terms of audit fees charged and the engagement decisions of both clients and auditors, especially for Big 4 auditors who audit the majority of large publically traded companies.
As noted above, audit firms may respond to PCAOB inspection findings by increasing training and audit effort in the specifically-identified areas of concern, and may face more pressure to do so if the deficiencies are specific to the auditor as opposed to deficiencies identified for all auditors. We expect this would result in higher audit effort and higher audit fees for clients with significant exposure to the accounting standards related to the identified audit deficiency, leading to our first hypothesis. It is also possible, however, that audit firms may decrease their fees in order to pacify clients considering dismissing auditors that have deficiencies identified in areas important to those clients (Abbot, Gunny, and Zhang 2013). Such a fee reduction, is also more likely to occur if the deficiencies are specific to the auditor.
Hypothesis 1: Audit fees are increased (reduced) when a Big 4 auditor's inspection report indicates the exposure to deficient auditing, given the client's use of accounting standards, is higher than it would be for other Big 4 auditors.
As an alternative to increased audit effort, audit firms may selectively resign from audit engagements or price themselves out of the market to avoid significant exposure to particular high risk audit engagements. Client firms may also choose to dismiss their audit firm if they believe they do not have sufficient expertise in auditing certain high risk areas. In both cases, we expect an increase in switching activity away from an audit firm without expertise to an audit firm perceived to have greater expertise. These predictions lead to the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2a: An auditor-client engagement is less likely to continue when a Big 4 auditor's inspection report indicates the exposure to deficient auditing, given the client's use of accounting standards, is higher than it would be for other Big 4 auditors.
Hypothesis 2b: On average, clients switching Big 4 auditors is will engage an auditor that results in lower exposure to deficient auditing than existed with the prior auditor.
Research Design
Data
We begin our analysis with PCAOB inspection reports for the Big 4 auditing firms between 2005 and 2011. 5 The PCAOB conducts annual inspections of these of these auditing firms, resulting in 28 inspection reports. The reports issued in a given year are usually based on inspections that occur in the prior year and are assumed to be related to audits of the clients' fiscal years ending the year prior to the inspection work.
Part I.A of the inspection reports, "Review of Audit Engagements," includes descriptions of the audit deficiencies identified by the PCAOB during their inspections. For this section in each inspection report, we use a keyword list for U.S. GAAP standards developed by Folsom, Hribar, Mergenthaler, and Peterson (2012) to identify accounting standards related to audit deficiencies detailed by the PCAOB. 6 An auditor is considered to be "deficient" in auditing accounting related to a standard if a keyword related to the accounting standard is identified in the inspection report. Whether a deficiency related to a certain accounting standard is identified is a function not only of the auditing proficiency, but also a function of the extent to which its clients use the accounting standard and the PCAOB's focus on the area. However, we believe that given Big 4 firms have broad client bases, and given that the PCAOB uses a risk-based approach to selecting the audits it reviews and its focus on certain accounting issues, the likelihood of the PCAOB reviewing auditing related to the accounting standards is relatively consistent across firms. We match relative impact numbers from the 10-K filings to the auditor deficiencies identified in the PCAOB inspection reports using the fiscal year of the reviewed audits and the companies' auditors is primarily driven by one auditor's inspection, which contained new deficiencies related to taxes and intangible assets.
Other data for the models is obtained from Audit Analytics and Compustat. Data on audit fees and auditor changes are from Audit Analytics. Client data for control variables in the models is obtained from Compustat. We require sample observations to have all necessary data items for the models and exclude financial firms (SIC 60-69) because these clients are likely to have different audit fee structures from other clients (Fields, Fraser, and Wilkins 2004) .
Models
Audit Fee Changes
We investigate Hypothesis 1 on whether changes in deficient auditing exposure affects audit fees using a model of audit fee changes. Specifically, we use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of audit fee changes on changes in deficient auditing exposure and control variables. The variables in the model are based primarily on work by Ettredge, Li, and Scholz (2007) and Hogan and Wilkins (2008) .
The form of the model is where ΔFEE it = change in the natural logarithm of audit fees for client i from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t; ΔADJEXP it = change in adjusted auditing exposure between the current PCAOB report issued during fiscal year t and the last PCAOB report prior to start of fiscal year t for client i's auditor; ΔSIZE it = change in the natural logarithm of total assets for client i from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t; ΔROA it = change in return on assets for client i from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t; ΔABSAACC it = change in the absolute value of abnormal accruals for client i from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t; ΔNSOP it = change in an indicator variable for a non-standard audit opinion for client i from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t (1 indicates change from standard to non-standard, -1 indicates change from non-standard to standard, 0 indicates no change); ΔMW it = change in an indicator variable for the existence of an internal control material weakness for client i from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t (1 indicates change from no weakness to weakness, -1 indicates change from weakness to no weakness, 0 indicates no change); ΔLEV it = change in leverage for client i from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t; ΔINV it = change in inventory scaled by total assets for client i from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t; ΔREC it = change in receivables scaled by total assets for client i from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t; ΔM&A it = change in an indicator variable for mergers and acquisition activity for client i from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t (1 indicates change from no M&A activity to M&A activity, -1 indicates change from M&A activity to no M&A activity, 0 indicates no change); ΔSEGS it = change in the number of reported business segments for client i from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t; ΔSPITEM it = change in an indicator variable for the existence of special items for client i from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t (1 indicates change from no special items to special items, -1 indicates change from special items to no special items, 0 indicates no change); ΔRESTRUCT it = change in an indicator variable for restructuring charges for client i from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t (1 indicates change from no restructuring charges to restructuring charges, -1 indicates change from restructuring charges to no restructuring charges, 0 indicates no change); YEAR = indicator variables equal to one if the observation for the corresponding fiscal year, and zero otherwise.
Complete variable definitions are available in Appendix C.
The variable of interest, ΔADJEXP, measures the change in deficient auditing exposure for the client-auditor pair, relative to the average exposure that would occur if the client used other Big 4 auditors. A positive coefficient on ΔADJEXP would indicate that audit firms increase their fees, either due to increased risk or increased audit effort, when the auditor-client relationship experiences an increase in exposure to deficient auditing. A negative coefficient would be consistent with auditors attempting to pacify clients that might otherwise dismiss the auditor and replace them with an auditor with fewer audit deficiencies in areas that are important to the client.
We control for a number of other variables we expect to be related to changes in audit fees from one year to the next. We expect that increases in firm size (ΔSIZE), inventory (ΔINV), receivables (ΔREC), and business segments (ΔSEGS) will be positively related to changes in audit fees because these variables are related to audit effort. Similarly, additional audit effort is likely to increase audit fees when clients engage in more special transactions such as restructuring (ΔRESTRUCT), mergers and acquisitions (ΔM&A), or special items (ΔSPITEM) or when clients have new auditing issues that lead to non-standard audit opinions (ΔNSOP) or the disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control (ΔMW) (Ettredge, Li, and Scholz 2007; Hogan and Wilkins 2008) . We also control for variables related to audit risk that will increase audit effort or the premium the auditor charges for bearing the risk. Changes in audit fees are expected to be negatively related to changes in return on assets (ΔROA) and positively related to changes in the absolute value of abnormal accruals (ΔABSAACC) and changes in leverage (ΔLEV). Finally, we control for the client fiscal YEAR to the capture time trend in audit fee changes.
Auditor Changes
We use a logistic regression model to investigate Hypothesis 2 on whether the adjusted auditing deficiency exposure affects the likelihood of auditor changes occurring. The unit of analysis is a clientinspection observation. For each annual PCAOB inspection report (r), there is one client-inspection observation for each publically traded client of the audit firm that has the necessary data. The dependent variable (AUDCH) is equal to one if an auditor change occurs between the inspection report release date and the lesser of one year or the auditor's next inspection report release, and zero otherwise. The control variables in the model are based on Ettredge, Li, and Scholz (2007) . The form of the model is where AUDCH ir = indicator equal to one if client i changes auditors between the time its auditor's inspection report is released and the lesser of one year or the auditor's next inspection report release, and zero otherwise; ADJEXP ir = adjusted auditing exposure calculated for client i using inspection report r; SIZE ir = natural logarithm of total assets for client i for the fiscal year ending prior to the release of inspection report r; ABFEE ir = abnormal audit fees for client i for the fiscal year ending prior to the release of inspection report r; NSOP ir = indicator variable equal to one if client i has a non-standard audit opinion for the fiscal year ending prior to the release of inspection report r, and zero otherwise; MW ir = indicator variable equal to one if client i has an internal control material weakness for the fiscal year ending prior to the release of inspection report r, and zero otherwise; LEV ir = leverage for client i for the fiscal year ending prior to the release of inspection report r; ABSAACC ir = absolute value of abnormal accruals for client i for the fiscal year ending prior to the release of inspection report r; AUDINDSHR ir = percent of the square root of client assets audited by client i's auditor in client i's two-digit standard industry code for the fiscal year ending prior to the release of inspection report r; INDUSTRY = indicator variables equal to one if firm i is a member of the two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code, and zero otherwise; YEAR = indicator variables equal to one if the observation for the corresponding fiscal year, and zero otherwise.
In this model, the variable of interest, ADJEXP, is the auditing deficiency exposure for the clientauditor pair less the average exposure that would have occurred if the client used other Big 4 auditors.
We expect a positive relation between ADJEXP and auditor changes, which would indicate that auditor changes are more likely to occur when auditors have deficiencies related to areas of accounting important to the client. The client may be more likely to dismiss the auditor because other auditors would have fewer deficiencies or the auditor may be more likely to resign because the client is seen as being higher risk to the auditor.
Other variables likely to affect auditor-client engagement decisions are included in the model as controls. We expect SIZE to be negatively related to auditor changes (AUDCH), because large clients are likely to be important to the audit firms. We also expect the auditor's market share of the industry (AUDINDSHR) to be negatively related to auditor changes because both the auditor and the client benefit from the auditor's industry expertise. Positive coefficients are expected on leverage (LEV) and abnormal accruals (ABSAACC) because higher values of these variables are associated with more risk, which will increase the likelihood of auditor resignations. Abnormal fees (ABFEE) are expected to have a positive relation with auditor changes because higher abnormal fees may be a sign that the auditor considers the client to be high risk and because clients are more likely to leave auditors charging high fees (Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson 2010; Ettredge, Li, and Sholz 2007) . Further, we expect non-standard audit opinions (NSOP) and material weakness disclosures (MW) to be positively related to auditor changes because these variables indicate higher risk and auditor-client tension. Finally, we include indicator variables to control for INDUSTRY and fiscal YEAR effects on auditor changes. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the audit fee changes test. The sample is comprised of year-to-year audit fee changes for Big 4 auditor clients that maintain the same auditor between the years.
Results
Audit Fee Changes
The sample is further limited to observations where a PCAOB inspection report is issued for the client's auditor between the years. These data restrictions and data requirements to the model yield a sample of 6,769 audit fee change observations. The "average" client firm is charged about $2.6 million in audit fees and the overall trend in fees (ΔFEE) is flat over the sample period. Further, the average firm in the sample is increasing in size (ΔSIZE), decreasing in return on assets (ΔROA), and is also decreasing in adjusted auditing exposure (ΔADJEXP), and the likelihood of having a non-standard audit opinion (ΔNSOP) or a material weakness in internal control (ΔMW).
In Table 2 Panel B, we separate the sample into observations with and without increases in audit fees. Audit fees increase in 3,429 observations or approximately 51 percent of the sample. There is only a weakly significant (Z-Stat = 1.68) difference in the median change in adjusted auditing exposure (ΔADJEXP) between client firms with and without audit fee increases, and no significant difference in mean values. Client firms experiencing increases in audit fees tend to be increasing in size (ΔSIZE), and have increases in receivables (ΔREC) and inventory (ΔINV). Clients with increasing audit fees also tend to have increasing leverage (ΔLEV), decreasing ROA (ΔROA), increasing absolute value of abnormal accruals (ΔABSAACC), and new non-standard audit opinions (ΔNSOP) and material weaknesses (ΔMW).
Further, these client firms also tend to have new mergers and acquisition activity (ΔM&A) and new special items (ΔSPITEM) . Surprisingly, however, increasing audit fees appear to be related to a decline in restructuring rather than an increase in it (ΔRESTRUCT).
Results for the audit fee changes regression are presented in Table 3 . The coefficient on the change in adjusted deficient auditing exposure (ΔADJEXP) is insignificant, indicating a lack of evidence for changes in audit fees related to exposure to deficient auditing for clients that do not change auditors.
This result suggests that auditors with deficiencies have difficulty increasing audit fees to cover the cost of additional audit procedures needed to remediate their deficient auditing, but also suggests auditors do not cut fees in order to retain clients where there is high exposure to deficient auditing.
Other significant variables in the model have the predicted signs. We find audit fee increases (ΔFEE) are positively related to increases in size (ΔSIZE), receivables (ΔREC), inventory (ΔINV), leverage (ΔLEV), and the absolute value of abnormal accruals (ΔABSAACC), and negatively related to return on assets (ΔROA) consistent with these variables increasing audit risk and effort. Further, increase in audit fees are related to new mergers and acquisitions activity (ΔM&A), new special items (ΔSPITEM), and new material weaknesses in internal control (ΔMW), which indicates these items also increase audit risk and fees.
Auditor Changes
Descriptive statistics for the auditor changes test are provided in Table 4 . Limiting the sample to Big 4 clients and data requirements yields a sample of 11,359 client-inspection report observations. The inspection reports lead to auditor changes within the lesser of one-year and the next inspection report in 456 observations or four percent of the sample. On average, the client firms in the sample have total assets (SIZE) of approximately $700 million and long-term-debt-to-asset ratios (LEV) of slightly less than 0.2. Table 4 Panel B separates the sample into observations with and without auditor changes. The two groups are significantly different in mean and median for all variables in the auditor change model except for the likelihood of non-standard audit opinions (NSOP) and the auditor's market share of the audit clients in the industry (AUDINDSHR). Importantly, the auditor switching observations have significantly higher values of adjusted audit deficiency exposure (ADJEXP) than observations where the auditor-client relationship is maintained. The clients switching auditors also are smaller companies (SIZE) with higher leverage (LEV), higher abnormal audit fees (ABFEE) more material weaknesses in internal control (MW), and a larger absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABSAACC). Table 5 displays the results of a logistic regression where the dependent variable equal to one if there is an auditor switch, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on adjusted deficient auditing exposure (ADJEXP), the variable of interest, is positive and significant at p < 0.05. This result indicates that PCAOB reports affect auditor-client relationships by leading to more auditor changes among auditorclient pairs where exposure to PCAOB-identified auditing deficiencies is high. This finding is in contrast to the conclusions of Lennox and Pitman (2010) who find that the overall number of issues identified in PCAOB inspection reports is not related to changes in auditor market share. Together, the results suggest that while PCAOB inspections do not change overall auditor market share, they do play a role in aligning clients' accounting with auditors' abilities.
A number of the control variables also have significant coefficients. Consistent with expectations there is a significantly positive relation between the likelihood of auditor changes and both non-standard audit opinions (NSOP) and the disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control (MW). These relations are consistent with auditors resigning from higher risk clients and clients dismissing auditors in search of more favorable audit reports. We also find significantly negative relations between auditor changes and SIZE and the auditor's market share of the client's industry (AUDINDSHR). These results are consistent with auditors wanting to retain their larger clients and with both auditors and clients wanting to maintain relationships where the auditor has more specialization in the industry. Table 6 examines how deficient auditing exposure (DEFEXP) changes for clients that switch from one Big 4 auditor to another. Within the Big 4, auditor changes occur in 157 cases or about 34% of our auditor change observations (with the remaining changes in our sample being from a Big 4 firm to a non-Big 4 firm). In these cases, the average deficient auditing exposure (DEFEXP) significantly changes from 6.44 before the switch to 5.83 after the switch (t-stat = -2.63). This result indicates that the new auditor-client pairings established from an auditor change result in lower deficient auditing exposure, which is one manner in which deficient auditing exposure is reduced overall.
Overall, the results show that information in PCAOB inspection reports does affect auditor-client relationships in the Big 4 audit market. Specifically, auditor changes are more likely when an auditorclient pairing creates more exposure to deficient auditing than the average pairing of the client with other Big 4 auditors. Further, when a new auditor-client pair is established, it has lower deficient auditing exposure than the prior pairing.
Conclusion
PCAOB inspection reports are highly visible critiques of auditors' work, but many have questioned whether the reports contain useful information. Our study investigates whether inspections affect auditor-client relationships by examining the relation between inspection findings and audit fee changes and auditor changes for Big 4 auditors and their clients. We examine this relation using a new measure of the information in the inspection reports that accounts for both clients' use of accounting standards and their auditors' deficiencies related to these standards compared to other Big 4 firms' deficiencies.
We find that our measure of relative exposure to deficient auditing is positively related to auditor changes, but is not related to changes in audit fees. These results suggest PCAOB inspections affect auditor changes, but auditors do not have the ability to increase fees to remediate deficient auditing. It also does not appear, however, that auditors reduce fees to retain clients when they have more deficiencies in areas important to the clients. Our findings are in contrast to Lennox and Pittman (2010) , who find no relation between the number of deficiencies identified and changes in auditor market share.
Our study has import implications for auditing regulation and practice. Our results on PCAOB inspection reports and audit fees suggest it may be difficult for auditors remediate their deficiencies since it appears they are not able to pass higher audit costs on to clients. 
